COODE ISLAND COMMUNITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
CICCC chair person
|John Luppino||Greg Twitt|
|City of Maribyr, GM City Dev /committee||Environ. Protec Authy / ex off committee|
community rep./ CICCC
WorkCover / ex off committee
community rep./ committee
|Commander /Metro Fire & Emerg Ser.|
community rep./ committee
|Environmental Protection Authority|
Manager Terminals P.Ltd./committee
|Environ. Protection Authority West. Dist.|
Combined Enviro. Groups /
|City of Melbourne|
|Dr Karen Manning|
Terminals Pty Ltd /
Dept. Human Serv, /ex off committee
ITEM 1. WELCOME BY THE CHAIR#
The chairperson welcomed the committee members and observers in
Apologies were received from Faye Simpson, Councillor
Cuc Lam, Peter Reddie, Ian Swann, Cathy Aktypis and Jarrod Edwards.
CONFIRMATION OF THE AGENDA
Draft Agenda was adopted.
4. CONFIRMATION OF MINUTES OF
PREVIOUS MEETING OF 13 AUGUST 2000.
The minutes were adopted.
5. PRESENTATION OF THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW
(DR KAREN MANNING, SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, VICTORIA UNIVERSITY)
Karen said she was required to interview 10 people with a set of prepared questions.
Her draft report to the committee represents the principles she drew
from the responses she received.
The three principal comments made were
Communication within the committee is good but there is a need for there to
be further links back to the community.
There is a need for clarification about CICCC individual member roles.
There is a need for greater time efficiency at meetings
said the process was designed to build in some things and to weed out others.
The scoring by numbers gives an indicator but is not necessarily a qualitative
assessment. She said the recommendations in the draft reflect what she heard
from those who were interviewed and she has added some embellishments as she
The committee discussed the draft and the following points were made
The meetings have been long and tiring especially when I have been working all
day and I understand that we need a lot of time to discuss the complex matters
we are dealing with.
Meetings were long when we were dealing with the ‘nuts and bolts ‘ issues of
the proposal but scheduling extra meetings would have been worse.
Sometimes I find it hard to articulate something I wish to say. This is not an
easy topic to understand and discuss.
Sometimes points that I want discussed are not included on the agenda.
I found it difficult to answer some of the questions in the Review, and it was
difficult to put a score to them. My scores may have been the same as another
persons but my reasons for the score may have been different.
Objective 7 is very important and that the CICCC must be seen by the community
to be actively achieving concrete outcomes on this matter of disseminating
information on Emergency Management.
There is a need for an objective that clearly states ‘CICCC members are to be
empowered to go out to their communities and communicate as necessary’.
CICCC Objectives are 3 years old maybe we should update them.
There is clearly a need for clarity around CICCC’s expectations of all
We can be more provocative if we know exactly what’s expected of us.
Sometimes I can not say what I want on behalf of those I am representing because
the Agenda is too long, we run out of meeting time and my comments cannot be
If we had clearer reporting arrangements then maybe we would get the support and
feedback from the community that we need.
I’m amazed at how little community interest there is about Coode Island
Other community groups leave it to HazMAG to be the community liaison arm.
HazMAG have been lacking some motivation since the decision was made by the
current government to continue with the redevelopment on the current site.
We have a good web site but we need other ways to communicate with the
The community need a practical ‘step by step’ list of information about what
to do if there is another emergency like the fire on Coode Island in 1991.
Councils should be doing this.
Are the Review Recommendations practical given our limited time frame?
Effectiveness Reviews are a waste of time when we have so much to do.
suggestion was made that five minutes be set aside at the beginning of
each meeting for
Departmental representatives to advise the Committee of any important
Robin circulated his comments on the review, and suggestions for a way forward. The following action was agreed:
Robin, Gordon and Peter B will draft the following for discussion at the
Revised CICCC Objectives
Committee expectations of the roles of members of the Committee
A list of practical actions, incorporating a number of the consultant’s
Gordon said that the draft review document did not
accurately communicate that despite a brief hiatus in its involvement
previously, the City of Melbourne were now working collaboratively with the
CICCC in the following ways
1. Sharing administrative costs of hosting the CICCC meetings with
Maribyrnong City Council.
2. Jointly funding the consultant to prepare a submission to the EPA’s 20(B) Conference with the City of Maribyrnong and presenting this material.
He said that MCC could send their Municipal Emergency Response Organiser (MERO) to the CICCC Emergency Management sub committee meetings.
Robin thanked Karen on behalf of the CICCC.
6. ACTION ITEMS FROM MEETING OF 14 SEPTEMBER 2000
6.1 Tools used by industry to communicate with neighbouring communities
Defer to next meeting. Ian Swann not present.
6.2 Study on the effects of
chemicals on the Altona community (Murray Franks and Ian Swann)
Murray has not been able to find any other reports apart from those
reported at a previous CICCC meeting. This matter will not be further pursued.
Release, media coverage, Web site update
See attachment 2.1 and 2.2
Robin has not checked the web page this month. There seems to be more
newspaper interest this month.
6.4 TPL to
propose worst case scenarios to HSE
7. CORRESPONDENCE OUT
7.1 Finalisation of CICCC
submission to EPA 19 September 2000
See attachment 3
7.2 Submission to VWA on the DG
See attachment 4
7.3 Letter to MPC re rail transport options
See attachment 5
8. CORRESPONDENCE IN
8.1 From EPA dated 21 September
providing advice on the purpose of the 20BConference
See attachment 6
8.2 From MPC dated 27 September
concerning future rail transport options
See attachment 7
8.3 From EPA to Terminals (7 September 2000) requesting further
advice(provided to Chair at 20B Conference)
See attachment 8
8.4 Email from Kevin Shea re Port
8.5 Carlo Carli (Melbourne Ports) consultation process.
See attachment 9
8.6 EPA dated 27 September
Michael asked if the CICCC made a submission to the Ports Strategic
Robin said that a verbal submission was made which included discussion
about rail options. Correspondence from MPC states that
future provision of rail infrastructure for Terminals is now a matter
between Terminals and P&O Ports.
On the 18 Oct there will be a simulated emergency exercise at the
Maribyrnong No1 Wharf. It is primarily a
drill for the Melbourne Ports Emergency Services.
The CICCC discussed the need for ample advertising of this exercise as
residents will be concerned by alarms and emergency vehicles in the area. The
government authorities were requested to do far more than is presently planned
in this regard.
ACTION. George will contact the Victorian Channel Authority and relay the CICCC’s concerns re above point. Trevor will bring the matter to the attention of the responsible officers within MFESB. Robin will issue a press release regarding this mater.
Deborah, Ted and Michael will attend the exercise and the debrief .
9. REPORTS OF THE 20B CONFERENCE
Peter B was unwell and unable to attend.
Robin said that it was an excellent 2 day conference with many
opportunities for discussion. The City of Maribyrnong, City of Melbourne
Department of Human Services and the EPA submissions supported many of the
points also made by the CICCC. He said that the CICCC had obviously
highlighted issues that the authorities had then also adopted.
George tabled information for the CICCC and said that the EPA had
requested Terminals to provide further information on the following
1. Attachment of venting condensers to some tanks or in the vapour
stream. They are refrigerated tubes that
are used for vapour recovery for Benzene, Toluene
and other tank storage facilities
2. Vapour returns back to tanks from the road tanker fill area
3. Costing for vapour returns of acrylonitrile
4. Propylene oxide emission reduction and scrubber efficiency
5. Fire safety study including information on bund capacities and the
volume of water spays deluge system.
(Still working on this).
6. Piping for Berth 1.
Robin said that Marilyn had informed him that Ian Rae’s
report would be publicly available on 20 October.
The Works Approval Report would be available on 2 December 2000.
10. FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE CONTRIBUTION TO RISK RESULTING FROM PROPYLENE
OXIDE (PO) STORAGE
Robin recapped Peter Reddie’s information to
the CICCC that an incident with the Propylene Oxide tank storage would be a
‘near field’ incident meaning that 10-7 contours would not
change. Peter R had also said that there would
not be any toxic gas emissions from such an incident.
However Robin wanted to know what might happen if there were a fire. He
wondered if it were possible that there could be a cascade effect including
other tanks on the site with a resultant toxic cloud effect.
GH outlined the relative differences between a pressurised
vessel containing LPG, VCM (Vinyl Chloride Monomer), PO and Ethanol.
The first two are a gasses at atmospheric pressure
where the latter are not.
Relative storage pressures are illustrated as
Emergency vents on LPG are set as high as 250 PSI.
Emergency vents on VCM are set as high as 95 PSI.
Emergency vents on PO are set as high as 10 PSI.
Emergency vents on Ethanol are set as high as 0.4 PSI.
For the high pressure tanks (LPG & VCM) an
explosion can take the form of a BLEVE – a boiling liquid expanding vapour
explosion. Parts of the tank could
be propelled over a kilometre and the size of the fireball that would be
following could be devastating to a wide area.
For PO & Ethanol, an explosion inside the tank
could at best propel a small object eg a vent lid some hundreds of metres.
It could kill someone if they were standing where it landed.
Its effect would be limited ie it would not cause any major or widespread
It could cause damage to nearby tanks and increase
the on site fire effect. It’s on
site risk is high. Its off-site
potential is low with respect to an explosion.
From a gas storage vessel such as LPG or VCM, the gas
cloud would be immense. A leak
would create a vapour cloud 270 times the size of the liquid inventory.
(It would then expand further as it mixed with the air.)
It could cover very long distances (100’s of metres).
For PO, the size of the vapour cloud is very limited.
Once the pressure in the vapour space was released, the cloud would
basically stop enlarging. PO would
remain a liquid in the tank and only evaporate slowly ie. no comparison to LPG
or VCM. A PO tank vapour leak is
calculated form a vapour cloud of length 50-75 metres.
Weather conditions would need to be very still ie still night time
An ignition of this cloud would not affect the
community, it would affect anyone in the vicinity of it, as could cause on site
damage. Fire would track the
ignition point to the source of the vapour leak.
Again, the risk is on site, not the community
A PO bund fire could be caused by a tank/pipeline
leak or tank rupture. The heat
generated would have a large on site affect as the heat would be intense.
Even presuming a fully efficient burn
(ie an efficient oxygen/vapour mixture) which would not occur in reality,
the heat of radiation at the source would be 120kw/m 2
This would translate into a heat contour from the source of
the fire at a level of 4.7kw/m 2
at just over 100 metres from the bund.
4.7kw/m 2 represents
the level which will cause pain in 15-20 seconds and injury after 30 seconds
exposure (unprotected). Again, the
effect in large on site but will not affect the community.
Worst Case Scenario - What will
reach the community
The issue then is what will reach the community.
Not a fire or explosion from PO. The
only danger is from the smoke that a fire (of any chemical) would create.
The QRA presumed that the heat of the fire and smoke would cause it to
rise. But, it does have the
potential to reach the community given it will move away from the site.
Another worst case situation is an unignited leak of acrylonitrile (AN).
In calm, night time, temperature inversion weather, a bund spill could
result in a vapour cloud some 400 metres from the source.
While it would be too thin to ignite, it could cause headaches and nausea
in some people. Sick people may be
Published information indicates that 35mg/m 3
for 25-45 minutes will cause headaches, nausea and disorientation.
500-2000 mg/m 3 exposure
from half to three hours could be fatal. This
is based on tests on rats where a rat was exposed to 360ppm for 3 hours.
It is this type of situation which needs to be considered in
relation to community risks, not the issue of PO. The relocation of PO therefore has no increased risk to the
Robin asked whether PO could trigger the Acrylonitrile
Matthew said that a burning PO event caused the AN
tank to be damaged, the AN would catch fire.
Emissions from burning Acrylonitrile (AN) is much less dangerous than
non-burning AN where a build up of a cloud may cause a more health affects. He
said that the risk contours take into account the possibility of an unignited
gas cloud. If the cloud burns, it rises very quickly.
Ian said that George had only covered 2 of the
possible 3 possibilities. He said George had covered the issues of the effects
of heat and toxicity, but that he did not present
on blast overpressure at all.
Matthew said that explosions could occur where eddies
are able to form.
Robin said it would be highly desirable for the
CICCC to be able to tell the community the extent to which the Terminals site
has become safer than it was in 1991, and how much it will further improve after
the upgrade. He doesn’t think the CICCC has reached this point. He didn’t
think the following questions had been adequately answered yet -
1.How safe is the site compared to 1991?
2. In future could there be an explosion and a toxic cloud ?
3. Does the movement of the PO tanks 300 metres increase risks to the
Ted said he would like to see a map dropped on
a plan of the site, showing what could happen where.
George said the risk does not increase with the
movement of the PO tanks because the storage technology has been improved.
Matthew will look closely at the above technical issue and make a presentation
to the CICCC at the next meeting. Matthew will invite Ian Thomas to be involved
in this work.
11. REPORTS FROM SUB-COMMITTEES
were no meetings last month.
12. AGENDA FOR NEXT MEETING (9 NOV 2000)
• Matthew Wylie presentation on PO storage
• 20B Conference Report - Ian Rae
• Sub Committee reports
Close 10.07 pm
Meeting Thursday 9 November 2000
Meeting Thursday 14 December 2000
** CANCELLED Jan 2001 Meeting
(replaced with the Dec 2000 meeting)
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