CICCC Minutes 12 October 2000

Robin Saunders	Michael Isaachsen
CICCC chair person	community member
John Luppino	Greg Twitt
City of Maribyr, GM City Dev /committee	Environ. Protec Authy / ex off committee
Deborah Macfarlane	Matthew Wylie
community rep./ CICCC committee	WorkCover / ex off committee
Ian Thomas	Trevor Perkins
community rep./ committee	Commander /Metro Fire & Emerg Ser.
Ted Towson	Marilyn Olliff
community rep./ committee	Environmental Protection Authority
Carlo Fasolino	Keith Smithers
Op. Manager Terminals P.Ltd./committee	Environ. Protection Authority West. Dist.
Dr Peter Brotherton	Gordon Harrison
Combined Enviro. Groups / committee	City of Melbourne
George Horman	Dr Karen Manning
Terminals Pty Ltd / committee	Victoria University
Murray Frank	Vanessa Richardson
Dept. Human Serv, /ex off committee	minute taker

Apologies were received from Faye Simpson, Councillor Cuc Lam, Peter Reddie, Ian Swann, Cathy Aktypis and Jarrod Edwards.

ITEM 5. PRESENTATION OF THE PERFORMANCE REVIEW
(DR KAREN MANNING, SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, VICTORIA UNIVERSITY)
AND DISCUSSION.

Karen said she was required to interview 10 people with a set of prepared questions.

Her draft report to the committee represents the principles she drew from the responses she received.

1. Communication within the committee is good but there is a need for there to be further links back to the community.

Karen said the process was designed to build in some things and to weed out others. The scoring by numbers gives an indicator but is not necessarily a qualitative assessment. She said the recommendations in the draft reflect what she heard from those who were interviewed and she has added some embellishments as she thought necessary.

• The meetings have been long and tiring especially when I have been working all day and I understand that we need a lot of time to discuss the complex matters we are dealing with.

• Meetings were long when we were dealing with the ‘nuts and bolts ‘ issues of the proposal but scheduling extra meetings would have been worse.

• Sometimes I find it hard to articulate something I wish to say. This is not an easy topic to understand and discuss.

• I found it difficult to answer some of the questions in the Review, and it was difficult to put a score to them. My scores may have been the same as another persons but my reasons for the score may have been different.

• Objective 7 is very important and that the CICCC must be seen by the community to be actively achieving concrete outcomes on this matter of disseminating information on Emergency Management.

• There is a need for an objective that clearly states ‘CICCC members are to be empowered to go out to their communities and communicate as necessary’.

• There is clearly a need for clarity around CICCC’s expectations of all representatives.

• Sometimes I can not say what I want on behalf of those I am representing because the Agenda is too long, we run out of meeting time and my comments cannot be heard.

• If we had clearer reporting arrangements then maybe we would get the support and feedback from the community that we need.

• Other community groups leave it to HazMAG to be the community liaison arm. HazMAG have been lacking some motivation since the decision was made by the current government to continue with the redevelopment on the current site.

• We have a good web site but we need other ways to communicate with the community.

• The community need a practical ‘step by step’ list of information about what to do if there is another emergency like the fire on Coode Island in 1991. Councils should be doing this.

The suggestion was made that five minutes be set aside at the beginning of each meeting for Departmental representatives to advise the Committee of any important developments.

Robin circulated his comments on the review, and suggestions for a way forward. The following action was agreed:

ACTION. Robin, Gordon and Peter B will draft the following for discussion at the next meeting:

3. A list of practical actions, incorporating a number of the consultant’s recommendations.

Gordon said that the draft review document did not accurately communicate that despite a brief hiatus in its involvement previously, the City of Melbourne were now working collaboratively with the CICCC in the following ways

1. Sharing administrative costs of hosting the CICCC meetings with Maribyrnong City Council.

2. Jointly funding the consultant to prepare a submission to the EPA’s 20(B) Conference with the City of Maribyrnong and presenting this material.

He said that MCC could send their Municipal Emergency Response Organiser (MERO) to the CICCC Emergency Management sub committee meetings.

6.1 Tools used by industry to communicate with neighbouring communities (Ian Swann)

6.2 Study on the effects of chemicals on the Altona community (Murray Franks and Ian Swann)

Murray has not been able to find any other reports apart from those reported at a previous CICCC meeting. This matter will not be further pursued.

Robin has not checked the web page this month. There seems to be more newspaper interest this month.

8.1 From EPA dated 21 September providing advice on the purpose of the 20BConference

8.3 From EPA to Terminals (7 September 2000) requesting further advice(provided to Chair at 20B Conference)

Robin said that a verbal submission was made which included discussion about rail options. Correspondence from MPC states that future provision of rail infrastructure for Terminals is now a matter between Terminals and P&O Ports.

On the 18 Oct there will be a simulated emergency exercise at the Maribyrnong No1 Wharf. It is primarily a drill for the Melbourne Ports Emergency Services.

The CICCC discussed the need for ample advertising of this exercise as residents will be concerned by alarms and emergency vehicles in the area. The government authorities were requested to do far more than is presently planned in this regard.

ACTION. George will contact the Victorian Channel Authority and relay the CICCC’s concerns re above point. Trevor will bring the matter to the attention of the responsible officers within MFESB. Robin will issue a press release regarding this mater.

Robin said that it was an excellent 2 day conference with many opportunities for discussion. The City of Maribyrnong, City of Melbourne Department of Human Services and the EPA submissions supported many of the points also made by the CICCC. He said that the CICCC had obviously highlighted issues that the authorities had then also adopted.

George tabled information for the CICCC and said that the EPA had requested Terminals to provide further information on the following

1. Attachment of venting condensers to some tanks or in the vapour stream. They are refrigerated tubes that are used for vapour recovery for Benzene, Toluene and other tank storage facilities

5. Fire safety study including information on bund capacities and the volume of water spays deluge system. (Still working on this).

Robin said that Marilyn had informed him that Ian Rae’s report would be publicly available on 20 October. The Works Approval Report would be available on 2 December 2000.

ITEM 10. FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE CONTRIBUTION TO RISK RESULTING FROM PROPYLENE OXIDE (PO) STORAGE

Robin recapped Peter Reddie’s information to the CICCC that an incident with the Propylene Oxide tank storage would be a ‘near field’ incident meaning that 10^-7 contours would not change. Peter R had also said that there would not be any toxic gas emissions from such an incident. However Robin wanted to know what might happen if there were a fire. He wondered if it were possible that there could be a cascade effect including other tanks on the site with a resultant toxic cloud effect.

GH outlined the relative differences between a pressurised vessel containing LPG, VCM (Vinyl Chloride Monomer), PO and Ethanol.

For the high pressure tanks (LPG & VCM) an explosion can take the form of a BLEVE – a boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion. Parts of the tank could be propelled over a kilometre and the size of the fireball that would be following could be devastating to a wide area.

For PO & Ethanol, an explosion inside the tank could at best propel a small object eg a vent lid some hundreds of metres. It could kill someone if they were standing where it landed. Its effect would be limited ie it would not cause any major or widespread damage.

It could cause damage to nearby tanks and increase the on site fire effect. It’s on site risk is high. Its off-site potential is low with respect to an explosion.

Vapour Cloud

From a gas storage vessel such as LPG or VCM, the gas cloud would be immense. A leak would create a vapour cloud 270 times the size of the liquid inventory. (It would then expand further as it mixed with the air.) It could cover very long distances (100’s of metres).

For PO, the size of the vapour cloud is very limited. Once the pressure in the vapour space was released, the cloud would basically stop enlarging. PO would remain a liquid in the tank and only evaporate slowly ie. no comparison to LPG or VCM. A PO tank vapour leak is calculated form a vapour cloud of length 50-75 metres. Weather conditions would need to be very still ie still night time conditions .

An ignition of this cloud would not affect the community, it would affect anyone in the vicinity of it, as could cause on site damage. Fire would track the ignition point to the source of the vapour leak.

Bund Fire

A PO bund fire could be caused by a tank/pipeline leak or tank rupture. The heat generated would have a large on site affect as the heat would be intense. Even presuming a fully efficient burn (ie an efficient oxygen/vapour mixture) which would not occur in reality, the heat of radiation at the source would be 120kw/m ².

This would translate into a heat contour from the source of the fire at a level of 4.7kw/m ² at just over 100 metres from the bund. 4.7kw/m ²represents the level which will cause pain in 15-20 seconds and injury after 30 seconds exposure (unprotected). Again, the effect in large on site but will not affect the community.

The issue then is what will reach the community. Not a fire or explosion from PO. The only danger is from the smoke that a fire (of any chemical) would create. The QRA presumed that the heat of the fire and smoke would cause it to rise. But, it does have the potential to reach the community given it will move away from the site. Another worst case situation is an unignited leak of acrylonitrile (AN). In calm, night time, temperature inversion weather, a bund spill could result in a vapour cloud some 400 metres from the source. While it would be too thin to ignite, it could cause headaches and nausea in some people. Sick people may be more affected.

Published information indicates that 35mg/m ³for 25-45 minutes will cause headaches, nausea and disorientation. 500-2000 mg/m ³ exposure from half to three hours could be fatal. This is based on tests on rats where a rat was exposed to 360ppm for 3 hours.

It is this type of situation which needs to be considered in relation to community risks, not the issue of PO. The relocation of PO therefore has no increased risk to the community.

Matthew said that a burning PO event caused the AN tank to be damaged, the AN would catch fire. Emissions from burning Acrylonitrile (AN) is much less dangerous than non-burning AN where a build up of a cloud may cause a more health affects. He said that the risk contours take into account the possibility of an unignited gas cloud. If the cloud burns, it rises very quickly.

Ian said that George had only covered 2 of the possible 3 possibilities. He said George had covered the issues of the effects of heat and toxicity, but that he did not present on blast overpressure at all.

Robin said it would be highly desirable for the CICCC to be able to tell the community the extent to which the Terminals site has become safer than it was in 1991, and how much it will further improve after the upgrade. He doesn’t think the CICCC has reached this point. He didn’t think the following questions had been adequately answered yet -

3. Does the movement of the PO tanks 300 metres increase risks to the community?

Ted said he would like to see a map dropped on a plan of the site, showing what could happen where.

George said the risk does not increase with the movement of the PO tanks because the storage technology has been improved.

ACTION. Matthew will look closely at the above technical issue and make a presentation to the CICCC at the next meeting. Matthew will invite Ian Thomas to be involved in this work.